Policy Implementation in Social Welfare: A Framework for Analysis by Carr Copeland, Valire & Wexler, Sandra
The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
Volume 22
Issue 3 September Article 4
September 1995
Policy Implementation in Social Welfare: A
Framework for Analysis
Valire Carr Copeland
University of Pittsburgh
Sandra Wexler
University of Pittsburgh
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw
Part of the Social Policy Commons, and the Social Work Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Social Work at
ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please contact
maira.bundza@wmich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carr Copeland, Valire and Wexler, Sandra (1995) "Policy Implementation in Social Welfare: A Framework for Analysis," The Journal of
Sociology & Social Welfare: Vol. 22 : Iss. 3 , Article 4.
Available at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw/vol22/iss3/4
Policy Implementation in Social
Welfare: A Framework for Analysis
VALIRE CARR COPELAND
University of Pittsburgh
School of Social Work
and
SANDRA WEXLER
University of Pittsburgh
School of Social Work
A review of the research on implementation of federal-state partnership
programs indicates a need for more analyses of the post-legislative phase
of social welfare policy. This paper addresses the importance of research
on policy implementation in social welfare. It examines some critical tools
in the policy implementation analysis process, presents a framework for
analysis, and offers recommendations to stimulate interest in the study of
the implementation process.
Researchers, policy-makers, and practitioners have increas-
ingly concerned themselves with the effectiveness of federally-
mandated, state-administered programs. 1 During the last 20
years, various scholars, recognizing that the interdependent rela-
tionship between and among government officials at the federal
and state levels is crucial to successful implementation, have be-
gun to analyze the policy implementation process (Goggin, 1987;
Goggin, Bowman, Lester, & O'Toole, 1990; Palumbo & Calista,
1990; Palumbo & Harder, 1981; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973; Van
Meter & Van Horn, 1975). Although many articles that provide
analyses of policy implementation are found in the literatures
of other disciplines, a review of articles published between 1978
and 1992 by six social work periodicals that focus on social policy
and social welfare research produced only twelve citations. Thus,
there is a pressing need for more analyses of policy implementa-
tion by social workers and social welfare researchers.
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This paper addresses the importance of research on policy
implementation in social welfare, examines some critical tools
in the policy implementation analysis process, and offers rec-
ommendations to stimulate increased interest in such analysis.
Public Law 100-485, the Family Support Act (FSA) of 1988, and
specifically the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) section
of the Act, is used to illustrate the types of issues addressed
by an implementation analysis. The FSA provides an important
challenge to national, state, and local evaluators to analyze state
officials' interpretation, application, and implementation of this
reform measure. There are many decisions that remain to be made
that will shape how the provisions of the Act will be carried out at
the state-level and that will determine how productive or punitive
the FSA will be nationally (Chilman, 1992; National Association
of Social Workers [NASW], 1988; Rom, 1989).
RATIONALE FOR STUDYING POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
Implementation is evolutionary, and is influenced by the ide-
ological, political, and economic climates in which it occurs. The
goals and objectives stated in legislation are interpreted initially
by administrators responsible for policy implementation. These
interpretations become broader and more varied as the policy
objectives filter down through the bureaucratic structure of the
implementing organization. The implementation process can fa-
cilitate or hinder program development. When the program de-
velopment phase is complete, what is actually implemented may
vary substantially from the original policy directive (Mazma-
nian & Sabatier, 1983; Nakamura & Smallwood, 1980; Palumbo &
Harder, 1981).
Research on welfare policy implementation has several pur-
poses: to address the influence of state bureaucratic factors on
welfare policy implementation; to explain variation in policy im-
plementation within and across states; to demonstrate the in-
terrelationship between the policy implementation process and
program performance; and to assess the extent of intended change
produced in the larger society by a program. Implementation
researchers attempt to explain the implementation process, ex-
amine the extent to which programmatic goals were satisfied,
and describe how well the policy performed, given the way in
which the state complied with the federal mandate.
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Implementation research is not necessarily prescriptive in the
sense of determining the goodness or rightness of policy state-
ments. Instead, it takes the policy articulated as a starting point,
as the set of propositions which will be transformed into actions
by a variety of actors. This does not, however, imply a mechanistic
or technocratic analytic view; norms, values, and preferences are
as much a part of implementation research as they are the policy
formulation and policy implementation processes.
The importance of implementation analysis can be appreci-
ated by considering the FSA, which was passed in 1988, but which
had not been fully implemented by several states as of 1992. The
FSA includes broadly defined educational and training opportu-
nities; job search, health benefits, and child-care supports; limited
work requirements for two-parent families; increased enforce-
ment of child-support payments; and up to a year of continued
child care and medical care for some families who leave AFDC
due to employment.
The central feature of the FSA is the creation of the JOBS
program which consolidates and expands prior authority for ed-
ucation, training, and work programs. Participation in the JOBS
program is required for selected AFDC recipients in exchange
for continued public assistance. The selected groups include: (1)
custodial parents under 24 years of age who have not completed
high school or who have little or no work experience; (2) recipi-
ents or applicants who have received AFDC for thirty-six of the
preceding sixty months; and (3) recipients within two years of
becoming ineligible for AFDC due to the age of their youngest
child (Chilman, 1992; NASW, 1991). Since recipients are expected
to work in exchange for public assistance, the FSA attempts to
shift AFDC from a redistributive program (i.e., one that redirects
wealth to benefit particular segments of society so as to satisfy
equity concerns) to a developmental program (i.e., one that at-
tempts to enhance directly the economic well-being of the state
or community) (Gueron, 1990; Rom, 1989; Sanger, 1990).
It is important to acknowledge at the outset limitations of the
FSA which may not support achievement of its goals of poverty
reduction and self-sufficiency. For instance, the FSA does not
specify how much education and training is acceptable in any
state program. Nor does the Act create or provide for the creation
of jobs. Instead, it largely emphasizes activities either to enhance
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the education and skills of recipients or to compel recipients to
locate and accept available employment. The effectiveness of ei-
ther of these approaches depends on the availability of jobs in the
local economy, and the Act does not assure that families attaining
employment will have enough income to meet their basic needs. It
also does not address the income needs of AFDC families who are
not employed (Chilman, 1992; Greenburg, 1992; Gueron, 1990). In
fact, Gueron (1990) asserts that the fundamental dilemma of the
FSA is the impossibility of simultaneously reaching these two ma-
jor policy goals-reducing poverty and encouraging self-support.
Although the policy details have been outlined by federal of-
ficials, the primary design, implementation, administration, and
coordination of the FSA is left to state officials (Evans, 1992; Reg-
gins, 1991; U.S. Congress, 1988). In the absence of a national
welfare standard, and given the unique social, economic, and
political conditions of each state, eligibility criteria and program
benefits can vary within the boundaries established by the federal
legislation (Evans, 1992; Rom, 1989).
If the uniqueness of implementation is dependent on the
above conditions, on the commitment to and interpretation of the
policy by implementing officials, and on the structural and orga-
nizational processes of the implementing organization (Cham-
bers, 1986; Glass, 1990; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975), it is impor-
tant for welfare policy analysts and evaluators to analyze these
operating characteristics in relation to the implementation pro-
cess. Although variation across state welfare programs is clearly
permissible and expected, the implementation procedures that
contribute to this variation need to be documented. Case studies
of how states move from a redistributive to a developmental
welfare system are needed to enhance our knowledge base and
to provide models for implementation analysis. Such informa-
tion will enable social workers to play an active role in shaping
evolving federal and state welfare initiatives.
A FRAMEWORK FOR STUDYING
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
There have been many attempts to understand, explain, and
analyze the relationship between policy and implementation.
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Although a multitude of case studies with varying conceptual
frameworks exist, there is no generally accepted theory to provide
guidance to research on policy implementation. Scholars have
not yet developed a typology for studying policy implementa-
tion, a major step toward theory building (Goggin et al., 1990).
As Goggin et al. (1990, p. 11) argue, "a topographical map that
characterizes the terrain in precise terms, indicates quantitative
measures, and specifies precise relationships among the various
elements is needed."
Despite these limitations, implementation research has man-
aged to shift the focus from "how a bill becomes a law" to "how
a law becomes a program." Such studies have demonstrated the
complex and dynamic nature of policy implementation and have
emphasized the importance of a policy subsystem and the dif-
ficulties that a subsystem creates for coordination and control.
Research on the implementation process has illuminated several
dilemmas that implementing officials may face and has identified
factors that seem to account for variation in programmatic results
(Glass, 1990; Goggin et al., 1990; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973; Van
Meter & Van Horn, 1975).
A review of the various conceptual frameworks employed in
implementation analyses suggests a number of conditions as req-
uisites for successful policy implementation: (1) clearly defined
goals and objectives; (2) administrators with technical compe-
tence to implement and execute the policy; (3) clearly defined pop-
ulations; (4) intelligible enabling legislation; (5) the publication
of federal regulations prior to program implementation; (6) pro-
gram procedures for implementors and administrators to follow;
(7) training assistance from the federal level to state implemen-
tors during implementation of joint programs; and (8) adequate
resources (Chambers, 1986; Glass, 1990; Goggin, 1987; Mazma-
nian & Sabatier, 1983; Nakamura & Smallwood, 1980; Pressman
& Wildavsky, 1973; Palumbo & Calista, 1990; Van Meter & Van
Horn, 1975). The implementation process also is facilitated or
blocked through the implementing organization's structure and
its functional processes (Gryski & Usher, 1980; Magill, 1984; Sosin,
1990; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975).
Building upon these prior studies, a framework is proposed
for implementation analysis. The framework incorporates the
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following domains: (1) enabling legislation; (2) federal regula-
tions; (3) organizational structure; (4) organizational process; and
(5) program performance (See Figure 1). The proposed framework
enables the implementation process to be studied and analyzed
so that inferences can be made about the relationship between
policy design, policy implementation, and policy outcome. It can
be applied to investigate how the administrative authority of
those responsible for implementing, coordinating, and adminis-
tering federally-mandated, state-administered programs affects
variation in policy implementation.
The enabling legislation and the federal regulations address the
legal contract between the federal and state governments. The
legislation is the actual law which mandates the policy decision.
The regulations contain the provisions which authorize the im-
plementation of the policy, including rewards for compliance in
carrying out the policy and legal sanctions for noncompliance
(Chambers, 1986; Goggin, 1987; Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983).
Organizational structure is defined as the degree to which the
implementing organization represents complexity, formalization,
and centralization (Goggin, 1987; Magill, 1984; Nakamura &
Smallwood, 1980). Organizational process is defined as how func-
tional activities, such as decision making, are affected by the
administrative procedures necessary for complying with the new
policy (Sosin, 1990). Program performance involves the actual out-
come, the result, of the implementation process. Assessment of
program performance is concerned with who and how many
clients or target groups were reached and the types and amount
of program's resources they received (Hasenfeld, 1984; Palumbo
& Calista, 1990).
APPLYING THE ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK TO THE FSA
The following sections illustrate the application of the pro-
posed analytic framework. The types of issues addressed in
implementation research are identified using the FSA as a case
example. These discussions are not intended to be definitive, but
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Figure 1:
Implementation Analysis Framework
Enabling Legislation
Federal Regulations
Organizational Structure
Organizational Process
Program Performance
Policy Goals & Objectives
Target Population
Fiscal Arrangements
Major Provisions
Eligibility Guidelines
Federal Administrator
State Administrator
Rules of Entitlement
Benefits
Provisions which Implement Policy
Sanctions for Compliance
Target Populations
Eligibility Requirements
Financing & Administration
Implementing Agency
a. Federal Bureaucracy
b. State Bureaucracy
c. Local Agency
Mission of Agency (ies)
Implementing Officials
a. Professional Orientation
b. Educational Training
c. Previous Experience
Communication Patterns
a. Top Down
b. Bottom Up
Internal Decision Making
a. Centralized
b. Decentralized
Resource Allocation
Who Governs
How Funds are Used
Who Benefits
Extent of Goal & Objective
Achievement
Activities Contribute to
a. Success
b. Failure
Mechanisms to Revise Failures
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are suggestive of the ways in which this framework can be used to
generate information about the policy implementation process.
Enabling Legislation
How federal legislation is drafted can affect the extent to
which public policy objectives are attained (Magill, 1984; Mazma-
nian & Sabatier, 1983; Nakamura & Smallwood, 1980; Palumbo &
Harder, 1981; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). The statutes, which
make the legislation binding, structure the implementation pro-
cess through the delineation of legal objectives, selection of imple-
menting institutions, provision of legal and financial resources to
those institutions, and regulation of the opportunities for par-
ticipation by nonagency actors in the implementation process
(Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983). To the extent that the statute pro-
vides precise and clear instructions to implementing officials and
others, the more likely it is that the policy outputs of the im-
plementing agencies will be consistent with the policy directive
(Magill, 1984). However, it is rare when ambiguity is not present
in federal legislation.
The FSA allows the state to set cash benefit levels. By doing so,
the federal government permits wide variation in the welfare ben-
efits that states can, and do, pay to welfare recipients (Rom, 1989).
The policy allows state officials to exercise discretion regarding
benefits and eligibility in order to satisfy the unique needs of
their citizenry, as determined by their local political and economic
climates (Peterson, 1980).
States are required to establish and operate a JOBS program
to give welfare recipients education, training, and work experi-
ence. In seeking to meet federally-mandated participation rates
with limited resources, state officials can impose extensive and
unproductive requirements on many families. In addition, JOBS
implementation cannot be viewed in itself as a comprehensive
response to the needs of poor families. JOBS implementation
does not address the low benefits, restrictive eligibility rules, and
frequent procedural arbitrariness facing families in need of AFDC
(Chilman, 1992; Greenberg, 1992).
The total cost of the FSA over 5 years is estimated by the
Congressional Budget Office to be $3.3 billion to the federal
government and $.7 billion to the states. Initially funding was
appropriated by Congress through 1991, but further funding has
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been appropriated for each of the federal fiscal years through
1995. Federal funding for JOBS in 1992 and 1993 was $1 billion
(Chilman, 1992). While these amounts seem like a lot, they are
actually a minimal resource commitment.
Federal JOBS funding is not open-ended (Greenberg, 1992).
Instead, each state is eligible to draw down a capped entitle-
ment amount from the federal government each year. The state's
capped entitlement amount is based on its pro rata share of the
total federal allocation. Most of the federal funds available to the
state for JOBS are at one of two matching rates: 60 percent or the
state's Medicaid matching rate for the JOBS program, whichever
is greater. Federal funds are also available to cover up to 50 percent
of administrative, transportation, and supportive service costs.
The state is eligible for open-ended federal funding at the state's
Medicaid match rate for child care expenses; however, matching
rates for child care administrative and other costs are determined
by separate formulae. Given the variety of formulae involved,
determining the match rate for a particular expenditure can be
problematic.
Federal Regulations
The details of a statute are generally spelled-out in regula-
tions. In addition to stating the rules of entitlement, the regu-
lations document enforcement procedures, including, as appro-
priate, incentives and sanctions. Regulations further clarify the
benefits to be provided, define the target population, and specify
eligibility criteria and administrative authority. They also may
identify areas of federal involvement such as technical assistance
provision, plan and program reviews, evaluations, and audits.
The regulations provide the guidelines for implementation,
but often do not address who is responsible for monitoring task
completion nor how this monitoring is to occur. Mechanisms to
ensure accountability are not always clearly stated, although the
penalty for noncompliance is usually explicit. Thus, each level of
government involved in policy implementation often develops
a separate, and potentially conflicting, system of accountabil-
ity. Together, the enabling legislation and the federal regulations
establish a binding legal contract between federal and state offi-
cials for policy implementation.
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The nature of implementation of federally-mandated, state-
administered programs rests, although not exclusively, on fiscal
and structural contracts. The contracts adhere to the elements of
organizational control. By stating the function for which funds
must be spent, the federal government specifies the conditions
and purposes, and regulates the processes by which state govern-
ments are to accomplish federal objectives (Chilman, 1992). Grant
giving acts as an incentive, an inducement, and as a facilitator,
for the continued influence of the federal government in state
capacity building and problem solving. Money, plus regulations,
is the medium through which the federal government influences
state affairs (Chambers, 1986; Chilman, 1992; Glass, 1990).
To begin operating a JOBS program, each state must submit a
plan to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
and must receive HHS approval. The state plan must include a
description of services to be provided and a description or flow
chart explaining the progression of clients into and through the
JOBS program. The plan must also present the state's decisions
on a number of state options, e.g., whether parents of very young
children will be required to participate, whether the state will
permit or assist post-secondary education, and how the state
will define "good cause" for failure to participate (Greenberg,
1992). In addition to the JOBS plan, the state is required to submit
concurrently for approval a Supportive Services Plan, describing
such things as the methods used to provide child care, the amount
the state will pay for such care, and the other supportive services
that will be provided.
Responsibility is vested with the Governor to assure that JOBS
activities will be coordinated with programs under the Jobs Train-
ing Partnership Act (JTPA) and with any other relevant employ-
ment, training, or education program available in the state. In
developing the state JOBS plan, and in carrying out the JOBS pro-
gram, the state AFDC agency must consult and coordinate with
other providers in order to: identify existing resources; prevent
duplication of services; assure that other program services are
available to enable participants to achieve self-sufficiency; and
assure that the costs for these other services (e.g., JTPA or other
employment services, adult education, early childhood education
programs) are not incurred by the JOBS program (Chilman, 1992;
Greenberg, 1992).
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Yet the regulations for the JOBS program may be at variance
with those for JTPA or other education and job training programs.
Although these programs share the goal of facilitating employ-
ment, contradictory regulations guiding the state towards this
end may constrain actual programmatic coordination. Funding
commitments within each program also may affect JOBS par-
ticipants' access to these other services. And competition about
how individuals are "counted" or "credited" could well develop
among the various programs.
Organizational Structure
Where a program is located within federal and state admin-
istering agencies is important because the policy outcome may
be more a reflection of the implementing organization and the
persons responsible for implementation than the legislation itself.
Two key factors in the organizational structure which influence
implementation are the appropriateness of the bureaucratic orga-
nization to the policy and the capabilities of the officials respon-
sible for carrying out the policy.
The degree of fit between the mission of the implementing
organization and the goals of the program to be implemented will
affect: the length of time it takes to put the program into operation;
the extent to which accommodations are made to opposing or
supporting groups; and the relationship between government
officials at different levels of the administering organizations
(Chambers, 1986; Chilman, 1992; Glass, 1990; Goggin, 1987; Mag-
ill, 1984; Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983; Palumbo & Harder, 1981).
If there is a good fit between the program being implemented
and the implementing organization, interpretation is simplified;
goals may not need further renegotiations; resistance is lessened;
and implementing officials can get on with the job of making the
policy work.
A good fit also is determined by the professional competence
of the officials authorized to carry out the mandate. The per-
sonnel responsible for administering the new program should
possess the professional knowledge, skills, and training needed
to increase the success of both program development and pro-
gram performance. Implementors within the organization must
deal with intra- and inter-organizational procedures, resource
allocation, bureaucratic norms, and the values and preferences
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of governmental and nongovernmental actors concerning pro-
gram development, service delivery, and the target population
(Chambers, 1986; Goggin, 1987; Magill, 1984). Nongovernmental
stakeholders include lobby, constituency, and consumer groups
who pressure implementors to administer policies in ways that
advance their own interests.
The requirements of the FSA are numerous and complex and
are likely to be burdensome to many states. For example, effec-
tive service coordination with other relevant programs is a major
feature of the JOBS program. Meeting this requirement may be
a challenge for many states, especially for those without prior
experience in welfare-to-work programs.
The legislation also requires that all funds for the program
be administered through the state AFDC agency, whether these
funds are from public or private sources and whether they go
to public or private services, such as child care or family ser-
vice agencies. Not surprisingly, previous research has found that
problems can arise with this method of fund collection and dis-
bursement (Chilman, 1992).
Moreover, initial enthusiasm and high hopes about the pos-
sibilities of using JOBS as a way to address barriers to employ-
ment for families receiving AFDC have begun to give way to an
increased sense of pessimism (Chilman, 1992). The Act's "pay-
offs," in terms of lower welfare costs and increased recipient
self-sufficiency through employment and child support, are not
immediate and will probably be very small or nonexistent, at
least without displacing other employees. State officials' primary
concern has become, not unexpectedly, the expected financial
outlay for their state (Chilman, 1992).
Program administrators will need to work closely and per-
suasively with various antiwelfare, low-tax political groups in
their communities, as well as with numerous advocacy and client
rights' organizations. Implementors will need to be highly skilled
at managing competing and conflicting demands arising from
actors in their organizations and in their communities. In ad-
dition, technical competence and practical skills are needed for
the program design and service delivery phases. Yet most staff
members of public welfare agencies are not equipped to carry
out the necessary job skills training assessments (Chilman, 1992).
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Organizational Process
Inter-organizational procedures such as communications, ad-
ministrative distance, and administrative complexity have an ef-
fect on the bureaucratic structure and thereby influence the func-
tional procedures of policy implementation. As Palumbo and
Harder (1981) point out, policies are implemented to produce as
little disruption as possible within the existing structure of the
implementing organization.
Key factors that affect the way in which the organization
functions include: the internal decision-making structure of the
organization; the degree of reliance placed on intermediaries;
the degree of disruption caused by the innovation; the degree
of resistance to change in organizational procedures; and the
number of officials from different organizational levels who are
engaged in the implementation process (Sosin, 1990; Van Meter &
Van Horn, 1975). Layers of "red tape" between the major decision
makers at the top of the policy sphere and the service personnel
at the bottom of the operations, coupled with a lack of clear lines
of communication, permit program implementors to use their
discretion as they attempt to turn specific policies into public
services.
The JOBS program expressly encourages states to find ways to
promote welfare recipients' self-sufficiency through employment
and job training. However, due to ambiguous and controversial
rules for participation, some state officials find it problematic
to answer questions about how JOBS is operating. It is often
extremely difficult to get accurate calculations of the number of
recipients participating in assessment or other activity compo-
nents of JOBS (Greenberg, 1992). What counts as participation?
Who counts as required participants-children and/or custodial
parents? What is the unduplicated count of families assisted by a
JOBS program?
The issue of "counting" intersects with organizational pro-
cesses in two ways. First, is how what is to be counted is de-
fined. In the JOBS program, decision making by local officials
regarding participation is complicated by the need to balance
numeric requirements against edibility criteria. When calculating
the number of persons required to participate, officials must work
to assure an acceptable rate of participation, according to HHS
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guidelines, in order to receive federal funding. At the same time,
they have to make decisions about who is to participate on a case-
by-case basis. Officials must exclude those who: (1) are exempt; (2)
have a good cause for not participating; (3) reside in an area where
there is no JOBS program; or (4) are not required to participate
because the state cannot guarantee needed child care. The case-
by-case exclusion method will vary at the local level and will
cause considerable variation in participant characteristics across
and within states. And after all the exclusions are considered,
according to Greenberg (1992), the number of persons required
to participate is substantially reduced, thereby posing a potential
threat to local achievement of an acceptable participation rate.
Second, is how counting is to be accomplished-that is, the or-
ganizational processes and procedures that need to be instituted
or modified to obtain management information on participation.
The accountability system required for the JOBS program may
well represent an additional burden to local and state program
implementors. Moreover, since accountability systems are not
standardized, acquisition of data beyond what is needed by a
particular level of organization may be viewed as an external
demand that conflicts or interferes with usual work processes.
Program Performance
Policy outcomes cannot be evaluated unless the policy has
been implemented and services delivered. "The delivery of ser-
vices shapes policy outcomes more than the design of the policy"
(Palumbo & Calista, 1990, p. xiii). "Outcomes," in this framework,
refer to the degree to which the policy's goals are achieved. Since
implementation is a process related to outcome (Goggin et al.,
1990; Palumbo & Calista, 1990), it is central to the policy cycle.
Examining the relationship between the implementation process
and the policy's outcomes permits one to make inferences about
program performance and the conditions under which intended
outcomes can be maximized. Further, clarifying the rationale for
political decision making during the implementation process gen-
erates information needed to redesign and restructure the policy
to improve program performance.
The following types of questions would allow us to gain a
better understanding of how a state's choices in JOBS implemen-
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tation relate to the results observed. First, what do program par-
ticipants actually do? What percentage of participants are in: basic
education? post-secondary education? a training program? a job
through on-the-job-training or wage subsidy? What proportion
are engaged in job search activities that don't improve their skills
or literacy?
Second, what is the program's sanction rate? A program's
sanction rate is a good indicator of whether the state emphasizes
the program's benefits or its punitive aspects. When a participant
is sanctioned, her share of the AFDC grant is cut off for a period of
time, with an escalating penalty structure. In a two-parent family,
the share for both parents can be cut off. Despite the sanction rules,
states can attempt to minimize the coercive features of JOBS by
emphasizing program access for volunteers, participant choice,
and conciliation efforts that seek to resolve problems without
resorting to sanctions (Greenberg, 1992).
Third, what choices and services are offered to the three
groups targeted by the FSA? What proportion of teenaged parents
are served? Of long-term recipients? Of those within two years
of becoming ineligible? What is the proportion of the total par-
ticipant pool that each of these groups represents? What special
service packages, if any, are used to accommodate each of these
target groups?
Depending on the research goals, other issues that could be
investigated include: How many participants get child care assis-
tance? What do they get? How much does the state actually pay
or reimburse? What is the role of recipient choice? What type of
recipient seem to benefit most from the program? How much of
the state's federal entitlement is being spent?
Ultimately, however, the central question is whether or not
the JOBS program and its related services actually assist welfare
recipients to leave the welfare rolls and to obtain jobs that will
allow them to support their families at an adequate level. Research
that sheds light on how this can be achieved-what particular
mix of local circumstances, experiences, actors, and interventions
is necessary-will make an important contribution to the ongoing
national debate about welfare reform and to the lives of welfare
recipients.
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CONCLUSION
Research on policy implementation, to date, has provided a
description of what implementation is and how it varies across
time, policies, and units of government. Advances have been
made in linking certain characteristics of the policy's design and
setting with outcome (Goggin et al., 1990). While there is no
shortage of variables to explain implementation and its outcomes,
critical indicators have neither been specified nor quantified. The
operationalization and measurement of key variables and the
careful testing of hypotheses have just begun (Goggin et al., 1990).
Focusing on the mechanisms that are used to implement pro-
grams, rather than solely on the programs themselves, is the best
way to develop a theory of implementation.
Social workers are often directly involved with the implemen-
tation of federally-mandated, state-administered initiatives such
as the JOBS program. Working in a variety of capacities within and
outside of implementing agencies, social workers play key roles
in shaping how services are ultimately delivered. These occupa-
tional vantage points afford social workers unique opportunities
to be both producers and consumers of implementation infor-
mation. Social workers can contribute to this body of research
by sharing their experiences with and insights into the imple-
mentation process. Implementation studies offer social workers,
whether employed as an agency bureaucrat or as line staff, an
information base for advocacy. Developing an understanding of
implementation as a process entailing multiple decision points
subject to leverage will allow social workers to exert their influ-
ence more actively and effectively
While implementation research has added much to our
knowledge of what implementation is and how and why it varies,
it has not been as helpful in providing a generally accepted the-
oretical framework; in differentiating among types of implemen-
tation outcomes; in specifying the causal pattern associated with
these outcomes; or in explaining the frequency with which these
patterns occur (Goggin, 1987). The framework proposed here
represents a beginning effort at the synthesis that needs to occur
to advance the development of implementation analysis in social
welfare. As such, it serves as a heuristic for investigating and
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understanding the transformation of a public law into a social
program.
Federally-mandated, state-administered programs, by their
very nature, entail ambiguous legislation and regulations in order
to allow for local "fit." Increased federal specificity about the
choice of implementing organization or the provision of technical
assistance might enhance program goal attainment without sacri-
ficing local discretion. In addition, inclusion of precise monitoring
and evaluation requirements could enhance the accountability of
local implementors to federal policy makers and intended benefi-
ciaries. Yet which facets of a program should be accompanied by
explicit federal criteria necessitates value judgments about social
objectives as well as assessment of local responses. The questions
of where and how a balance can be struck between federal and
state interests remain pressing. Case studies of various federally-
mandated, state-administered programs would enhance insight
into this tradeoff and further the dialogue on policy implementa-
tion in social welfare.
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